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SECURITY THROUGH FREEDOM. American Political Thought and Practice.
By Alpheus Thomas Mason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1955. Pp.
xi, 232. $2.90.
The role of political versus judicial restraints upon governmental authority in the United States is the subject of these Messenger Lectures delivered at Cornell University by the McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence
in Princeton University. Beginning his analysis with a consideration of the
political theories influencing the Founding Fathers, Professor Mason discounts Locke's position as the primary so11:rce of American political philos-
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ophy. He admits that Madison and Hamilton, like Locke, felt that restraints on government could be imposed by the governed in the exercise of
their political power, but he points to the important fact that they also
felt that auxiliary restraints must be provided by checks within the government itself. The seeds of judicial review found fertile ground for development in such a theory of government.
In spite of its early formulation as a restraint upon governmental authority, judicial r.eview was little used during the first one hundred years
of the Republic's history. However, Professor Mason traces the development during this same period of two forces, political democracy and economic oligarchy, whose eventual conflict revealed its true genius. After an
initial victory by the surging forces of political democracy, property interests found their shield in judicial review and their sword in substantive
due process. For forty-seven years, from Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul
R.R. v. Minnesota -to NLRB v. ]ones-Laughlin Steel Corporation, the
Supreme Court provided the judicial brake upon government.
What caused the demise of restraints imposed by the judiciary on governmental action in the economic sphere? Professor Mason minimizes the
role of political pressures upon the Court. He stresses the recognition and
adoption by Hughes and Roberts of the Holmes-Stone tradition of judicial
restraint. That tradition is based upon a recognition, first, that the judge
is often reflecting his own predilections in his decisions; second, that those
predilections are unsound which fail to admit the need for governmental
intervention to preserve individual liberty from economic forces; and third,
that independent of the soundness of those predilections, the judiciary is
ill-suited to decide such economic questions. Mason feels that the recognition of the essential validity of these points, not only by Hughes and
Roberts but also by the subsequent appointees to the. Court, has led to the
withering away of judicial restraiµts in this area.
Professor Mason is not ready to admit, however, that the Court has
abdicated all power to impose judicial restraints upon governmental authority. He points to two areas in which the Court is still active, i.e., in resolving the conflict between federal and state authority and in restraining
governmental infringements of First Amendment freedoms. While offering a balanced presentation of the doctrine of "preferred freedoms," Professor Mason doubts that judicial restraints can retain much vitality in
the latter area after their retreat from the economic sphere.
If judicial restraints are no longer to be relied upon, must resort be had
exclusively to political restraints? In the economic sphere Professor Mason
notes the development of the theory of "Welfare Capitalism"-i.e., the
control by business, and especially big business, of economic activity in
order to insure general prosperity-as an attempt to place restraints upon
governmental activity by obviating the need for it. However, he is skeptical of business executives' fitness for dealing with the broad social and
economic problems involved and fearful of the almost complete absence
of any restraints on their power exercised by the bulk of the citizenry.
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Professor Mason feels, therefore, that "official, politically responsible government must insist on monopolizing coercive power, as against any and
all private aspirants for such power."
In the sphere of First Amendment freedoms he is also clear that it is
no longer feasible to rely upon judicial restraints-or a constitution or bill
of rights. Reliance must be placed upon political restraints; "the vitality
of free government depends primarily upon the people themselves." Pro. fessor Mason feels that this vitality will exist only if the people recognize
that tolerance of all beliefs is essential to the continued development of
truth and free institutions.
The difficulty with Professor Mason's approach to First Amendment
freedoms is that it is based upon two assumptions which are subject to
some question. He determines that tolerance of all beliefs is essential by
resorting to the Milton-through-Mill theory that merely by providing an
open forum for the conflict of ideas we can assume that truth will somehow prove victorious. However, if truth is to be looked upon as something more than those opinions which the most powerful in the community
can force their fellows to accept, then this assumption is as naive as the
one of Adam Smith that the general economic good will necessarily follow
from the unrestrained conflict of individual interests. Laissez-faire concepts are as fallacious in the sphere of ideas as in the sphere of economics
when they permit a well-disciplined minority, employing all the modem,
organized media of mass communication to hammer the malleable minds
of the community into a determined pattern of belief. Irrespective of this
point, however, Professor Mason's approach presents a second difficulty.
He assumes that the community will recognize the essential rationality of
his scheme and thereby develop the tolerance necessary to its fruition. This
assumption would have found ready acceptance in the eighteenth century
Age of Enlightenment (I might suggest "Enchantment" as a better description) but it is hardly in accord with twentieth century views. Professor
Mason lays too much stress upon the rational element in man in an age
in which it becomes increasingly clear that the irrational elements predominate.
William R. ]entes, S.Ed.

